We consider situations in which agents are not able to completely distinguish between all alternatives. We say that an agent's preferences respect individual objective indifferences if the agent is indifferent between any two alternatives whenever an agent cannot distinguish between them. We present necessary and sufficient conditions of such a domain of preferences under which majority rule is quasi-transitive and thus Condorcet winners exist for any set of alternatives. Finally, we compare our proposed restrictions with others in the literature, to conclude that they are independent of any previously discussed domain restriction. JEL classification: C71, D71.
Introduction
When societies ask their members to vote, different voters have reason to view different alternatives under different lights. Some may care a lot for some of the issues, and not for others. Some may be aware of differences that others can hardly perceive. Some may be strongly affected by measures which are irrelevant for the life of others. Differences in opinion, information and interest are only three of the reasons why not everyone attaches the same importance to all of the choices faced by society. This is the reason why we want to model classes of voting situations where the sets of preferences which are admissible for some voter are different from those that one can expect from others. More specifically, we emphasize the asymmetries in individual preferences that result from the fact that some voters may systematically rank some alternatives as being indifferent, while other voters may be able to sharply distinguish between them, and to express strong preferences in their regard.
Specifically, we shall consider preference domains where each agent is associated with a partition of the set of alternatives. Each set in the partition of an agent includes those alternatives among which the agent is always indifferent. Indifference stands here to express a number of circumstances that could be differentiated in other contexts, but that become equivalent for our analysis of the majority rule. Two alternatives will be treated as necessarily indifferent if it is the case that the agent will never prefer one above the other, whether this is due to lack of interest, opinion or information.
Although details will be provided later, let us emphasize that we are not characterizing a specific preference domain, but a family of such. Each of the domains in the family will be specified by a profile of partitions of the set of alternatives (one for each agent), satisfying one of two conditions for each triple of alternatives. These conditions are on the interrelation between the indifference classes of different agents. Any triple of alternatives may be "free" for some agents, admitting the ranking of the three by these voters in any order. However, the partitions must be interrelated in such a way that, eventually, the existence of these "free triples" does not disrupt the effectiveness of majority voting.
Our main result is that any partition satisfying our conditions defines a family of preference profiles under which majority rule is always quasitransitive. Therefore, we characterize a family of domain restrictions, based on the distribution of indifferences across members of society, under which one can guarantee that a Condorcet winner always exists. Since our condition defines a wide variety of possible environments, we hope that authors may find the opportunity to specialize their models in a variety of ways that fit our general pattern. But we are already in position to suggest a number of applications.
For a first example, consider an election in which the candidates are linearly ordered, from left to right. Any agent is eligible as a candidate, and is entitled to decline the position if eventually elected. It is therefore interesting to establish not only a winner, but also a list of alternates in case of resignation. Each agent has then one neighbor to his left, and one to his right (except for those at the extremes, who only have one neighbor). We allow each agent to freely order himself and its immediate neighbors. Some agent may prefer to be elected rather than seeing his neighbors elected. Others may prefer their neighbor to the right (or left) to be the winner. Likewise, second and third positions in the ranking are free. Hence, our preferences allow for free triples of alternatives. Yet, we also assume that agents cannot clearly distinguish between a victory by their neighbor in the right and the victory of any other candidate in the same direction (this may be due to myopia, or else result from rational calculations). He is indifferent among all candidates to his right, and also among all candidates to his left. In this example, then, each agent has (at most) three indifference classes: all people to the left of the voter form a class, all people to the right of the voter form a second class, and the voter himself is a third class. These classes can be ordered in any possible way. We shall prove that if all agents have preferences of this type, the majority relation associated to any profile of opinions by any number of voters is quasi-transitive (i.e., the strict majorities among alternatives respect transitivity). This is sufficient for the existence of Condorcet winners. It also allows to guarantee the existence of path independent selections (Plott, 1973) from the set of Condorcet winners: elections can be organized sequentially without any fear for agenda manipulation.
Our example can be extended. The linear structure is unnecessarily narrow. Agents may be at the nodes of any tree. Therefore, each agent may have a different number of neighbors, as many as the number of branches starting from or arriving to that node. An agent with k neighbors may now freely rank k + 1 classes of alternatives, including oneself as a singleton class. Each of the remaining classes includes one neighbor and all other candidates which are further out than this neighbor within the tree structure. This is a very substantial extension of the domain: very perceptive people can have many neighbors and thus freely rank many classes of candidates. Other agents may be restricted by their positions to only rank a few groups. Many structures are allowed, provided they can be represented by a tree, of any form. We later go further into the example based on a tree by connecting it with a model recently discussed by Demange (2004) .
These examples are rather special, and leave room for many other ap-
plications. Yet, the examples already suggest that the reasons for agents to be indifferent among sets of alternatives may come from different sources, ranging from technological to purely subjective, and may be associated to asymmetries of different sorts, which can be formalized through networks, rankings or partitions. We are aware that in certain contexts it may be attractive to distinguish between indifference and incompleteness when modelling the inability or the lack of willingness of some agents to express a strict preference between some pairs of alternatives. But we feel that this distinction would not lead to any substantial or operational gain in our context, since expressing indifference or not expressing any preference are equivalent for the workings of majority rule. The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we present our model. In Section 3, we state and prove the main result, and we show that the examples we have briefly presented are indeed instances where our condition holds. In Section 4, we discuss the differences between our suggested domain restrictions and those previously considered by the literature on social choice and political economy.
Agents and Preferences
Let N = {1, . . . , n} denote the finite set of agents and A the finite set of alternatives. We always assume that |N | ≥ 3 and |A| ≥ 3. Agents have preferences on the set of alternatives, which are given by complete, reflexive, and transitive binary relations on A. The preference relation of agent i is denoted by R i , his strict preference relation by P i and his indifference relation by I i . Let R denote the set of all complete, reflexive, and transitive binary relations on A. A (preference) profile is a list R = (R i ) i∈N specifying for each agent i his preference relation R i on A. Let R N denote the set of all profiles. We consider the problem of society N having to choose a member from A. For example, N is a committee or a faculty board having to elect a chair from A. In such a situation an agent often does not have sufficient information to distinguish between all members of A. In other words his preference relation will express individual objective indifferences, i.e., he is indifferent between any two alternatives which he cannot distinguish. The objective indifferences of agent i are given by a partition S i of A. Then R S i is the set of all preference relations respecting i's objective indifferences:
for all a, b ∈ A such that {a, b} ⊆ S for some S ∈ S i ⇒ aI i b}.
Note that the domain R S i does not exclude any subjective indifferences of i (given his objective indifferences). We may want to rule out any indifferences between alternatives belonging to different members of S i since agent i is able to distinguish them. In other words, agent i's preference will often be strict for alternatives belonging to different members of S i . Then P S i is the set of all preference relations respecting i's objective indifferences and being strict for any two alternatives which agent i is able to distinguish:
Let S = (S i ) i∈N denote the profile of individual partitions of A, R S = × i∈N R S i , and P S = × i∈N P S i . We call R S the set of weak profiles which are admissible under S and P S the set of strict profiles which are admissible under S. A triple (of alternatives) is a subset of A containing exactly three elements. We call a triple {a, b, c} free in S i if i is able to distinguish between a, b and c, i.e., for all S ∈ S i , |S ∩ {a, b, c}| ≤ 1 (and agent i may rank the alternatives a, b, and c in any conceivable way).
When S i is the finest partition, i can perfectly distinguish among all alternatives. Many papers start from the domain of linear orderings and use the results derived for the linear case for the whole set of weak orderings. We cannot use this approach here since linear orderings are often ruled out by S.
Quasi-Transitivity of the Majority Rule
Majority is one possibility for society to choose one alternative from A. Our purpose is to identify necessary and sufficient conditions for quasi-transitivity of the majority rule given the agents' objective indifferences. For each profile the majority relation is defined as follows: given R ∈ R N and a, b ∈ A, its majority (binary) relation, denoted by R m , is defined as
It is well known that the majority relation derived from an arbitrary preference profile may be cyclic. When this occurs, the choices by majority are not well defined. We are thus particularly interested in conditions guaranteeing that this problem is avoided. For each profile R, an alternative is a (Condorcet) winner if it is not beaten (in the strict sense) by another alternative under the majority relation, i.e., a ∈ A is a (Condorcet) winner of R if for all b ∈ A, aR m b. The existence of winners is guaranteed at those profiles where the majority relation is quasi-transitive (i.e., the strict relation associated with the majority relation is transitive 1 ). Formally, the majority
relation R m is quasi-transitive if for all triples {a, b, c} the following holds:
Our basic result provides necessary and sufficient conditions on S for the quasi-transitivity of the majority rule on P S .
Definition 1 l Dichotomous Preferences (l DP). The partition profile S satisfies l DP for a triple {a, b, c} if at least l agents cannot distinguish at least two alternatives in the triple, i.e., there is L ⊆ N such that |L| ≥ l and for each i ∈ L there is some S ∈ S i with |S ∩ {a, b, c}| ≥ 2.
Our next property requires the following notation. Fix the partition profile S and a triple {a, b, c} ∈ A. Let N [ab]c = {i ∈ N : for some S ∈ S i , {a, b} ⊆ S and c / ∈ S} denote the agents who cannot distinguish between a and b and who distinguish c from a and b. Similarly we define
The word "parity" will be used in reference to oddness or evenness of a number.
Definition 2 (n−2) Equal Parity Dichotomous Preferences ((n−2) EPDP).
The partition profile S satisfies (n−2) EPDP for a triple {a, b, c} if it satisfies (n − 2) DP and the numbers of agents, who cannot distinguish exactly two alternatives in the triple, all have the same parity, i.e., the numbers n [ab]c , n [ac]b , and n [bc]a are either all even or all odd.
Theorem 1 Let S = (S i ) i∈N . Then majority rule is quasi-transitive on the domain P S if and only if S satisfies (n − 1) DP or (n − 2) EPDP for any triple of alternatives.
Proof. Throughout the proof we fix a triple {a, b, c} of A. Let N f {a,b,c} denote the set of agents for whom {a, b, c} is free in S i , i.e., they may have any ranking on {a, b, c}. Formally,
Given a profile R and x, y ∈ A, let N R xy = {i ∈ N : xP i y} denote the set of agents who strictly prefer x to y under R.
(Only if) We show necessity. Suppose that the majority rule is quasi-transitive on the domain P S and consider the triple {a, b, c}. We distinguish several cases depending on the number of agents for whom the triple {a, b, c} is free.
Hence, S satisfies (n − 1) DP for {a, b, c}. If 
Let
Let We have (3) and (4) we obtain
Similarly, we have N (2) and (4) we obtain
Summing up (5) and (6) yields
Note that if (5) or (6) holds with strict inequality, then (7) holds with strict inequality.
. If aP 1 c, then from (7) we obtain |N R ac | > |N R ca | and aP m c, the desired conclusion. If bP 1 a, then the inequality of (5) remains valid when adding two to the right hand side. Thus, by summing up this inequality and (6) we obtain
Similarly, if cP 1 b, then the inequality of (6) remains valid when adding two to the right hand side. Thus, by summing up this inequality and (5) we again obtain
and aP m c, the desired conclusion. This exhausts all possible cases 2 and R m is quasi-transitive on {a, b, c} if S satisfies (n − 1) DP for {a, b, c}.
Second, suppose that S satisfies (n − 2) EPDP for the triple {a, b, c} and S does not satisfy (n − 1) DP for {a, b, c} (otherwise we use the previous proof to conclude that R m is quasi-transitive). Then S satisfies (n − 2) DP and because S violates (n − 1) DP, we must have |N 
Note that 
If aP 1 b and bP 2 a (or bP 1 a and aP 1 b), then similarly we obtain
If bP 1 a and bP 2 a, then similarly we obtain
Since bP m c we obtain analogously from (n − 2) EPDP the following inequalities: if bP 1 c and bP 2 c, then
If bP 1 c and cP 2 b (or cP 1 b and bP 1 c), then similarly we obtain
If cP 1 b and cP 2 b, then similarly we obtain
We now combine (9), (10), or (11) with (12), (13), or (14).
If (9) and (12) hold, then aP 1 c and aP 2 c and by taking the sum of the two inequalities, we have
and aP m c, the desired conclusion. If (9) and (13) hold (or (10) and (12) An immediate corollary of Theorem 1 is the characterization of the necessary and sufficient conditions for majority rule to be quasi-transitive when agents are allowed to have subjective indifferences (given their objective indifferences).
Definition 3 (n − 2) Unconcerned Agents ((n − 2) UNCA). The partition profile S satisfies (n − 2) UNCA for a triple {a, b, c} if at least n − 2 agents cannot distinguish the alternatives belonging to the triple, i.e., there are distinct j, k ∈ N such that for each i ∈ N \{j, k} there is some S ∈ S i with {a, b, c} ⊆ S.
Corollary 1 Let S = (S i ) i∈N . Then the majority rule is quasi-transitive on the domain R S if and only if S satisfies (n − 1) DP or (n − 2) UNCA for any triple of alternatives.
Proof. We prove Corollary 1 along the lines of the proof of Theorem 1. Throughout the proof we fix a triple {a, b, c} of A. Let N f {a,b,c} denote the set of agents for whom {a, b, c} is free in S i .
(Only if) We show necessity. Suppose that majority rule is quasi-transitive on the domain R S and consider the triple {a, b, c}. Because P S ⊆ R S , we know by Theorem 1 that S satisfies (n − 1) DP or (n − 2) EPDP for {a, b, c}. Thus, we just need to show that if S satisfies (n − 2) EPDP and not (n − 1) DP for {a, b, c}, then S must satisfy (n − 2) UNCA for {a, b, c}. Suppose that S does not satisfy (n − 2) UNCA. Since S satisfies (n − 2) EPDP and not (n − 1) DP, we must have |N Having proved our basic results, the rest of the section is devoted to introduce a number of relevant qualifications.
Example 1 has the natural interpretation of a faculty board having to elect a department chair. Any faculty member is eligible, and usually the winner has the possibility of accepting or rejecting the election. Suppose the faculty is objectively divided into two groups, say theorists and applied, that each voter considers his or her own case as separate from the rest and that each voter treats all other candidates as members of one of the two groups, being indifferent between any two theorists or between any two applied people (other than his or her own). All possible orderings of the three personalized indifference classes (oneself, theorists and applied, minus eventually oneself) are admissible. For an even number of faculty members our conditions hold, and the use of the majority rule guarantees that the derived pairwise comparisons between candidates satisfy quasi-transitivity. If the number of faculty members is odd, then majority rule violates quasi-transitivity.
Example 1 Let A = N and {N 1 , N 2 } be a partition of N . For all i ∈ N , let S i = {{i}, N 1 \{i}, N 2 \{i}}. Let S = (S i ) i∈N . If |N | = n is even, then it follows from Theorem 1 that majority rule is quasi-transitive on the domain P S : let {a, b, c} be a triple of alternatives. If {a, b, c} ⊆ N 1 (or {a, b, c} ⊆ N 2 ), then S satisfies (n − 1) DP for {a, b, c}. Otherwise, one pair in the triple belongs to N 1 or N 2 . If say a and b belong to N 1 , then all agents in N \{a, b} regard a and b objectively indifferent (and distinguish c from a and b) and all numbers n [ab]c = n − 2, n [ac]b = 0, and n [bc]a = 0 are even (since n is even), i.e. S satisfies (n − 2) EPDP.
If |N | = n is odd, then it follows from Theorem 1 that majority rule is not quasi-transitive on the domain P S : since |N | ≥ 3, there exists a triple of alternatives {a, b, c} such that (a, b ∈ N 1 and c ∈ N 2 ) or (c ∈ N 1 and a, b ∈ N 2 ). Then {a, b, c} is a free triple for agents a and b and S violates (n − 1) DP for the triple {a, b, c}. Furthermore, all agents in N \{a, b} regard a and b objectively indifferent and n [ab]c = n − 2 is odd (since n is odd) whereas n [ac]b = 0 and n [bc]a = 0 are even, i.e. S violates (n − 2) EPDP for the triple {a, b, c}.
Note that each agent's admissible preferences allow for at least one free triple (and therefore, for at least n − 2 free triples) and often two agents can completely distinguish a given triple (more precisely, if a and b belong to N 1 and c belongs to N 2 , then {a, b, c} is a free triple for a and b).
In Example 1 the winner may reject the election and the chair is offered to the candidate who is the winner of the majority relation restricted to the remaining candidates. Hence, it is important that the majority relation yields for any set of alternatives a winner, i.e., majority rule is a social decision function. This is guaranteed by quasi-transitivity of the majority rule.
3
Our next example is inspired by Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton (2001) where a candidate has to be chosen for a position and both outside and inside candidates are considered for the position. The position could be the head of a subdivision in a company or an administrative position at a university. Then the set of inside candidates is the overlap between the set of alternatives and the set of voters. The outside candidates are the candidates who are not inside. Inside candidates distinguish between inside and outside candidates. Furthermore, the chair of the nomination committee (say the department head) and another representative of the institution (say the dean) are not candidates and can rank the candidates in any conceivable way, i.e. they can express strong preferences in their regard.
Example 2 Let A ∩ N = ∅ and |N \A| = 2. We will call A ∩ N the set of inside candidates, A\N the set of outside candidates, and N \A the voters who are not up for nomination. For all i ∈ A ∩ N , let S i = {A ∩ N, A\N }, and for all i ∈ N \A, let S i = {{a} : a ∈ A}. Let S = (S i ) i∈N . If n is even, then it follows from Theorem 1 that majority rule is quasitransitive on the domain P S : let {a, b, c} be a triple of alternatives. Another application, where restrictions of the type we proposed do apply, is Demange (2004) . She has studied the distribution of profits from cooperation in games with hierarchies. Hierarchies are described by a tree, which describes connections between agents, and by a specific individual, among all the agents, who plays the role of the principal. Demange (2004) shows that if only coalitions which are properly connected can form (she calls them teams), then the (restricted) core of the cooperative game among these agents is nonempty and easy to describe. The admissible teams (and thus, the resulting core distribution) depend on the tree and also on the specific agent who plays the role of principal. One may extend the analysis of Demange (2004) by separating these two ingredients, and by allowing all possible hierarchies which arise from the same tree, as the principal changes. In Demange's interpretation, the tree expresses possible channels of communication among agents. Suppose that these channels are technologically determined, but that the directions of hierarchical communication may be chosen. For example, all agents may vote on who is going to play the role of the principal. Their preferences will depend on the payoffs that they will get in the core, depending on who is the principal (for a given tree). It turns out that agents will get the same payoff for all principals who are on the same branch away from some of their immediate neighbors. That is, preferences induced by the proposed extension of Demange's model satisfy (n − 1) DP: given a triple {a, b, c}, there is exactly one agent for whom {a, b, c} is free, namely the agent who is located at the median of a, b and c. Hence, the majority rule would always determine (at least) one winner if agents in that context would vote for a principal. This example is mentioned to illustrate that the restriction arises even in rather unexpected contexts. It suggests that other situations where someone must be chosen to play a special role, may give rise to similar conditions. Of course, voting is only one of the possible methods to choose an agent to play a role. In certain contexts, especially if side payments are possible, these roles may be auctioned (Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein, 2002) . But voting is, to say the least, one of the most prevailing methods to choose agents, and it is good to know about conditions where its simplest version, simple majority, will work properly.
Related Literature
Note that all our properties could have been equivalently defined for preference profiles instead for the partition profile S: for instance, just replace "for some S ∈ S i , {a, b} ⊆ S" by "aI i b". We chose to state them in terms of S because then the definitions are independent of whether we consider the set of strict profiles or the set of weak profiles admissible by S. Below we will refer to the equivalent definition of our properties for preference profiles when comparing them with restrictions on preference profiles made by previous literature.
There exists a vast literature on domain restrictions and their implications under different rules of preference aggregation. A very complete monograph is due to Gaertner (2001) . The most studied aggregation rule is simple majority, and the standard properties which are sought from the majority relation are transitivity, quasi-transitivity, acyclicity or the existence of a maximal element of the relation. Among the many restrictions which have been studied, the most popular is still that of single-peakedness (Black, 1948) . Other domains were analyzed by Inada (1964 Inada ( ,1969 , Sen and Pattanaik (1969) , Demange (1982) , and Grandmont (1978) .
4 Our domains are different than any of those we just mentioned, and they do not seem to have been considered by the previous literature. We now comment briefly on the analogies and the difference between our type of restrictions and those proposed by other authors. There is a fundamental difference between our setup and all the others we mention (with the exception of Grandmont's). In our case, the set of orders of the alternatives which are admissible may be different for each of the agents. Indeed, each voter is allowed to have at most as many indifference classes as the number of members in his partition of objective indifference classes. Hence, agents are allowed to have different sets of preferences. Under our restrictions, admissible domains are personalized. By contrast, the classical restrictions we now briefly review do limit the set of preferences which are admissible, but then allow all agents to exhibit any of the preferences in this common pool. Inada (1964) considered the case where each agent can classify the set of alternatives into two groups, and then will consider all alternatives within the same group as indifferent. He was concerned with transitivity of the majority rule and showed that if a profile satisfies n DP (for each agent there is a pair which he regards indifferent), then majority rule is transitive. Obviously n DP implies (n − 1) DP but not vice versa. Furthermore, note that Inada (1964) deals with transitivity of majority rule whereas we deal with quasi-transitivity and Inada (1964) did not search for necessary conditions. Our conditions also rely on the establishment of "large" indifference classes, but the analogy stops here.
Another interesting set of restrictions were proposed by Sen and Pattanaik (1969) and Inada (1969) . Let R ∈ R N and {a, b, c} be a triple of alternatives. The profile R satisfies value restriction (VR) for the triple {a, b, c} if there is one alternative in the triple, say a, that is not ranked worst (or best or medium) by all individuals who are not indifferent between a, b, and c (i.e. (for all i ∈ N such that ¬aI i bI i c, aP i b ∨ aP i c) or (for all i ∈ N such that ¬aI i bI i c, bP i a ∨ cP i a) or (for all i ∈ N such that ¬aI i bI i c, (aP i b ∧ aP i c) ∨ (bP i a∧cP i a))). The profile R satisfies extremal restriction (ER) for the triple {a, b, c} if the following holds: if bP i aP i c for some i ∈ N , then cP j aP j b for all j ∈ N such that cP j b. The profile R satisfies limited agreement (LA) for the triple {a, b, c} if there are two alternatives, say b and c, such that bR i c for all i ∈ N . These restrictions define domains under which the majority rule and other forms of binary comparisons will be well behaved. Sen and Pattanaik (1969, Theorem V) show that a necessary and sufficient condition for the majority rule to be quasi-transitive is that a profile satisfies for each triple of alternatives at least one of the conditions, VR, ER or LA. However, in their result the number of individuals is variable and therefore it does not apply to our model. Sen and Pattanaik (1969, p. 192) show that any profile violating VR, ER, and LA for a triple {a, b, c} must include a three-ordering-subset of the form [1.1, 2.1 or 2.2 or 2.3, 3.1 or 3.2 or 3.3]:
(1.1) aP i bP i c (2.1) bP i cP i a (2.2) bP i cI i a (2.3) bI i cP i a (3.1) cP i aP i b (3.2) cP i aI i b (3.3) cI i aP i b
Note that when n is even, (n − 1) DP and (n − 2) EPDP only rule out [1.1,2.1,3.1]. Any other combination is allowed by (n − 1) DP and (n − 2) EPDP. If n is odd, say n = 5, then (n − 1) DP and (n − 2) EPDP allow for [1.1,2.1 and 2.3,3.2 and 3.3]. Furthermore, by Theorem 1, none of Sen and Pattanaik's (1969) conditions is necessary in our model. Demange (1982) proposed an extension of single-peakedness based on the relative positions of alternatives in the vertices of a tree (the original notion of single-peakedness is based on their position on a line, which is a very special tree). 5 Demange's proposal bears a resemblance with ours in that it builds from a set of a priori given connections among alternatives which can be formalized as a tree. Finally, Grandmont (1978) proposed a notion of intermediate preferences leading to attractive and quite different domain restrictions. This notion is based upon the possibility of defining when an agent is in between two others. It requires that, if the two initial agents agree on how to rank a certain subset of alternatives, then any agent who is intermediate between them also shares these common preferences.
